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COMMENTS
RANDALL V. SORRELL: A NEW WRINKLE IN
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
DEBATE
JUSTIN KRAMER*
INTRODUCTION
The campaign finance debate rages on.1 Congress' continuous
attempt to reform the national political process has sparked one
of the most politically driven battles of the twentieth and twenty-
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2007; B.S., Finance, summa
cum laude, St. John's University, May 2004.
1 See Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(discussing how there is a "huge elephant - and donkey - in the living room in all
discussions of campaign finance reform"); see also Sonia P. Fois & Leslie A. Nickel,
Corporations Still Have Some Rights to Participate in the Electoral Process, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1997, at S.40, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/publications
_articles.cfm?practice_ID=O&publicationid=514 (arguing that there are many different
explanations for why the campaign finance debate continues, even in light of the
contribution ban placed on corporations, foreign nationals, and labor unions); Brandon L.
Lowy, Comment, Not Quite Shays' Rebellion: Putting McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission in Perspective, 60 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 283, 283-84 (2006) (noting that the
current debate stems from the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and how
significant the debate is because "it is an exercise in democracy").
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first centuries. 2 In the past, Congress has taken numerous steps
in order to initiate this change. 3 Through a number of different
legislative acts, Congress banned certain political contributions
made by corporations,4 labor unions,5 and banks throughout the
early to mid-twentieth century.6 The first of such legislative acts
was the Pendleton Act of 1883 which aimed at controlling
appointments to political office,7 but it proved to be largely
ineffective. 8 It was not until the Tillman Act of 1903 when
2 See Thomas Cmar, Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of
Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 443, 443
(2005) (discussing money and how it is "the lifeblood of electoral politics", with the
candidate raising more money winning 94% of the congressional elections in 2002, thus
making campaign finance a critical political issue); see also John M. de Figueiredo &
Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S CAL. L. REV. 591, 621-22 (2005) (noting how
changes in campaign finance reform policy are driven by corruption concerns and an
interest in "democratizing the political process", giving more individuals a chance to
participate in self-governance).
3 See Victoria S. Shabo, "Money, Like Water...": Revisiting Equality in Campaign
Finance Regulation After the 2004 "Summer of 527s" 84 N.C. L. REV. 221, 230 (2005)
(noting that Congressional attempts at regulating individual citizens' campaign finance
contributions began in the early 1970's with the Federal Election Campaign Act); see
generally Primo Fontana, CERCLA Derivative Suits, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 741, 753
(2000) (stating that one such step Congress has taken is to establish corporate campaign
laws to curb corporate influence on the political process).
4 See Lowy, supra note 1, at 286-87 (discussing how corporations are now forbidden
from giving soft money contributions to federal election candidates and their respective
party committees); see also Fontana, supra note 3, at 753 (noting that Congress wanted to
prevent corporations from using corporate dollars to finance political campaigns, without
the consent of shareholders).
5 See David D. Storey, Note, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth
PACs and Providing a Model for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167, 173
(2002) (highlighting labor unions and their contributions to PACs as a means of avoiding
Congressional restrictions on individual donations); see also Charles E. M. Kolb &
Christopher Dreibelbis, Campaign Finance Reform: A Business Perspective, 50 CATH. U.
L. REV. 87, 95 (2000) (discussing the late twentieth century and how labor unions used
loopholes in the law to circumvent "hard dollar" limits on individual candidate donations).
6 See DIANA DWYER & VICTORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS, LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH:
CONGRESS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 4-5 (2001) (noting that under the auspices of
President Theodore Roosevelt, Congress passed the Tillman Act in 1907 which banned
national banks from giving money to federal campaigns); see also Justin A. Nelson, The
Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 533 (2000)
(discussing Congress' first attempt to reform the campaign finance system in the early
twentieth century by banning national banks from giving to federal election campaigns).
7 See Steve Padilla, In Politics, Money Talks - And Keeps Talking Despite Reforms,
HOOVER INSTITUTION, July 16, 2000, http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/history/
reform3.html (noting how the Pendleton Act declared that a federal worker was under no
obligation to "contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that
he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so"); see also Scott D.
Slater, Comment, Where the Buck Stops: An Analysis of Presidential Telephone
Solicitations under 18 U.S.C. § 607, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 851, 868-69 (1998) (explaining the
purpose of the Act as a means of eliminating the spoils system and political corruption as
a whole).
8 See Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look at Waters v. Churchill and United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union. Constitutional Tensions Between the Government
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Congressional statutes began to have a real bite in the campaign
finance arena. 9 The Tillman Act, passed during President
Theodore Roosevelt's tenure as President, prohibited national
banks and corporations from providing funds for federal
campaigns.10 In 1910, Congress passed the Publicity Act, which
forced campaign committees in the House of Representatives
''operating in two or more states" to disclose any contributions
they received in excess of $100.11 Fifteen years later, Congress
passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which closed a loophole
found in the Publicity Act, allowing "non-election-year
contributions to escape disclosure."12 Though other minor acts
were passed over the next fifty years, they did not have a major
impact on election campaigns. This includes the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947, which prohibited labor union contributions to
political campaigns. 13
In the early 1970's, Congress focused its attention on
individual citizens' contributions, beginning with the enactment
of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") of 1971, later
as Employer and the Citizen as Federal Employee, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2231, 2248-49 (1995)
(noting how the act failed to provide protection to employees who were "subjected to
alleged unwarranted personnel actions while on the job"); see also H. Manley Case,
Federal Employee Job Rights: The Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 29 HOW. L.J. 283, 288-90 (1986) (explaining the inadequacy of the Pendleton Act in
that it provided "no process or review of removal actions").
9 See Adam Winkler, Election Law As Its Own Field of Study: The Corporation in
Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1999) (calling the Tillman Act the "first
federal campaign finance law"); see also Farrah Nawaz, Note, Campaign Finance Reform
"Dollar for Votes"- The American Democracy, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 155, 156
(1999) (highlighting Congress' first successful attempt at controlling monetary influence
in politics).
10 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b (2006) (declaring contributions by national banks and
corporations to federal candidates illegal, even if for purposes of funding primary
elections, political conventions, or caucuses); see Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Speech and
Citizenship: Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2002) (discussing the current form of
the Tillman Act, barring direct contributions by corporations to federal candidates and
corporate "independent expenditures" on behalf of the corporations).
11 See Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons Learned from Vermont's
Pending Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2003) (noting how
the Act was of little historical significance); see also DWYER, supra note 6, at 4-5
(discussing the 1910 Publicity Act).
12 Huff, supra note 11, at 248.
13 Laws passed during the middle half of the 20th century had little effect on election
campaigns. See Huff, supra note 11, at 247-48. For a discussion of other minor legislative
attempts at campaign finance regulation, see DWYER, supra note 6, at 4-5. The Hatch Act
of 1939 prohibited federal employees from "active participation in national politics." Id. at
5. This act was revised and limited within one year. The revised act limited the
fundraising and spending abilities of party committees that operated in more than one
state. Expenditure ceilings of three million dollars per year were implemented. Id. at 5.
2007]
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amended in 1974.14 FECA limited individual donations to
political committees to $5000 per year and initially included
expenditure limits as well.15 However, due to a number of
loopholes in the FECA framework, individuals remained able to
contribute to political activities, so long as the money spent did
not go directly to political parties or federal candidates.16
Congressional legislation was passed throughout the last two
decades of the twentieth century, but all proved ineffective in
combating the FECA loopholes.17  Most recently in 2002,
Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA")18, which stated that national political parties could not
accept monies in excess of statutory limits.19 The primary
purpose of BCRA was to "plug[] 'the soft-money loophole' and
put[] in place funding and disclosure regulations for 'issue ads."'20
In light of the Congressional reforms, the Supreme Court has
been faced with the arduous task of interpreting the adopted
14 See Huff, supra note 11, at 247 (discussing the legislature's first modern attempt at
"comprehensive campaign finance reform"); see also Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE
L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996) (highlighting the limits imposed by FECA on individual
contributors to election campaigns, specifically in presidential elections).
15 See de Figueiredo, supra note 2, at 597 (noting how expenditure limits were struck
down by the Court in Buckley on First Amendment grounds); see also Deborah Goldberg,
Federal and State Campaign Finance Reform: Lessons for the New Millennium, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2002) (explaining how monetary caps on contributions, regulated by
FECA, are called "hard money" contributions).
16 See Shabo, supra note 3, at 234-35 (noting how campaign finance bills were drafted
throughout the 1980s and 1990s in order to close up the loopholes left by FECA, but such
legislation was widely ineffective); see also Goldberg, supra note 15, at 1145 (discussing
how soft money contributions given to political parties for the purposes of "party-building"
actually "escapes FECA's source and amount restrictions").
17 See Shabo, supra note 3, at 236 (discussing how large allowable soft money
donations were made, all of which avoided "express advocacy" which was outlawed in
Buckley); see generally Goldberg, supra note 15 (discussing the ineffectiveness of FECA
and its loopholes).
18 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36 & 47 U.S.C.). The Act's main
focus is broadcast communications and its goal is comprehensive federal campaign
finance reform. See Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging
Challenge for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1073 (2005).
19 See BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2003) (limiting individual
contributions to $2,000 per candidate, per election); see also Michael Saxl & Maeghan
Maloney, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Unlimited Consequences and the Maine
Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 467 (2004) (explaining the BCRA and how political
parities may not "solicit, receive, or direct" monies donated from contributors to "any
other organization").
20 Shabo, supra note 3, at 236 (discussing how members of Congress recognized the
"inequities in the way campaigns were run and funded."); see McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003) (noting how 2 U.S.C.S. § 441i prevents the use of soft
money contributions).
[Vol. 22:1
RANDALL V. SORRELL: A NEW WRINKLE
legislation and weighing its constitutionality. One of the most
intriguing issues is what limits, if any, may be placed on
campaign expenditures by electoral candidates? The seminal case
in this area continues to be Buckley v. Valeo.21 Here, the Court
distinguished between limits on campaign contributions and
restrictions on candidate expenditures, 22 applying a rigorous
review and upholding the Act's contribution limits while striking
down its expenditure restrictions. 23 Using the text of the
Constitution as its baseline, the Court noted how both
expenditure limits and contribution limits "operate in an area of
the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution."24 In justifying the contribution limitations
and striking down the expenditure caps, the per curiam opinion
stated, "expenditure ceilings impose[d] significantly more severe
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and
association than [did] its limitations on financial
contributions."25 The Court also held that "corruption or the
appearance of corruption" was, at the time, the only recognizable
constitutionally permissible justification for regulating campaign
finance.26
After grappling with the corruption justification, the Court
commented on another proposed validation for the limits, namely
the interest in "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
21 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
22 Id. at 19-23, 58-59, 143 (explaining how contribution restraints do not impede upon
First Amendment rights to the same extent as the act's expenditure limitations because
the former only restrains symbolic act of donating money to someone else who then uses it
to facilitate their own speech, whereas the latter directly restrains an individual from
spending his own money to facilitate his own political speech).
23 Id. at 29, 45, 58-59, 143 (holding contribution limitations constitutional given
government's "weighty interests" in restricting contributions are sufficient to justify
limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms, while also holding governmental interest
in preventing actual or perceived corruption inadequate to justify expenditure
restrictions).
24 Id. at 14 (noting how the First Amendment provides the greatest protection to
political expression in order to "assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." (quoting Roth v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
25 Id. at 23.
26 Id. at 25-29. "It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit
the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $ 1,000
contribution limitation." Id. at 26.
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groups to influence the outcome of elections."27 The Court
commented that such an interest is "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment" and thus struck down the expenditure limits
accordingly.28
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
commented that while the Court was justified in finding
stringent limitations on expenditures unconstitutional, the Court
in dealing with contributions "ignores the reasons it finds so
persuasive in the context of expenditures."29 Justice Blackmun
agreed with the Chief Justice that no distinction could be made
between expenditure and contribution limits. 30 Both Justice
White and Justice Marshall found that expenditure limits should
be upheld because neither contribution nor expenditure limits
were in contravention of the First Amendment. 31
The Court attempted to further clarify the role money plays in
the electoral process in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.32 The majority expanded First Amendment rights by
striking down a Massachusetts statute33 aimed at curbing
contributions made by banks or other corporations "for the
purpose of... influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to voters, other than one materially affecting any of
the property, business or assets of the corporation." 34 After
upholding the contribution/expenditure distinction found in
27 Id. at 48.
28 Id. at 49 (noting how the First Amendment was designed to secure "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
29 Id. at 241. Chief Justice Burger said that expenditures and contributions were "two
sides of the same First amendment coin." Id. He noted that limiting contributions would
have the net effect of limiting expenditures and would effectively place a ceiling on the
amount of political debate the Government wanted to take place. Id. at 241-42. In his
argument, Chief Justice Burger alludes to the fact that it does not matter who is paying
to "utter the words", whether it is the candidate himself or some third party, it is the
communication of those ideas that is the central question. Id. at 244. Finally, Chief
Justice Burger points out that independently wealthy candidates will not be affected by
the Act since it chooses to strike down expenditure limitations, but not contribution
limitations. Id. at 244 nn. 9-10.
30 Id. at 290 (commenting that no "principled constitutional distinction" can be made
between contribution and expenditure limitations).
31 See id. at 257-66, 286-90 (White, J. and Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
32 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (2006).
34 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West
1977)).
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Buckley, the court noted that "[t]he risk of corruption perceived
in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in
a popular vote on a public issue."35 The Court found no
compelling interest in "equalizing the voices of individuals" and
held that legislatures may not suppress the speech of some in
order to promote the speech of others.36 Justice White in dissent
argued that while corporate communications clearly fall within
the speech protected by the First Amendment, their speech
should be limited since such entities are merely "artificial
entities" that do not necessarily reflect the political views of
shareholders. 37  The dissent reasoned that the ability of
corporations to raise funds for political speech, coupled with a
corporation's ability to reach the masses, was enough of a
compelling interest to warrant a restriction on corporate
speech. 38
In another landmark decision, McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,39 the Court upheld the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA) of 1992, rejecting First Amendment
challenges to those Congressional provisions aimed at (1)
preventing the flow of soft money,40  (2) "electioneering
communications,41 (2) the related disclosure provisions, 42 and (4)
the ban on union and corporation general treasury funding of
electioneering communications."43 Specifically, the bill at issue
35 Id. at 790.
36 Id. at 790-91 (stating "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment...." (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 n.30)).
37 Id. at 804, 809-10 (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing that corporate speech is
protected under First Amendment, but explaining how corporations are subject to more
restrictions than individuals because of their nature).
38 Id. at 809-13. Justice White discusses the fear of "corporate domination" in the
political arena and how the Massachusetts statute adequately restricts corporate speech,
ensuring that shareholders are not subject to support political ideals that have nothing to
do with the company in which they are invested in and the revenue stream the
corporation makes. Id. at 812.
39 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
40 Id. at 181-82 (finding that the BCRA provision, which generally prohibited the flow
of unregulated soft money, did not violate candidates' or officeholders' free speech or free
association rights).
41 Id. at 230-31 (discussing the courts disagreement with plaintiffs' challenge of
electioneering communications as unconstitutional, finding that the communications bear
a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of 'shed[ding] the light of
publicity' on campaign financing" (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976))).
42 Id. at 194-96 (upholding the use of disclosure requirements).
43 Id. at 195-96, n.79 & accompanying text (discussing the portion of the BCRA which
"bars corporations and labor unions from funding electioneering communications with
2007]
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limited political advertisements and other communications paid
for by groups, corporations, and unions. 44 The McConnell Court
found that soft money contributions "lead to actual corruption
and the appearance of corruption", thus banning the use of such
campaign funds.45
Still, while the Court has looked to McConnell as a supplement
to the existing Buckley framework, the open questions stemming
from an interpretation of the Congressional campaign finance
legislation with regard to expenditure limits remain. 46
Specifically, it is uncertain how the three-part test established in
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC47 will be interpreted
with regard to expenditure limits. 48 The Court, as articulated in
Nixon, first asks whether the provision in question is entitled to
full First Amendment protection. 49 Second, the Court needs to
money from their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a 'separate
segregated fund' for such expenditures," and finding that there is an important state
interests in providing the electorate with information, deterring corruption, and avoiding
any appearance thereof, which is accomplished by such a bar).
44 Id. at 134 (discussing a provision of the Bill that "prevents circumvention of the
restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local
candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public
communications that promote or attack federal candidates"); see generally de Figueiredo,
supra note 2, at 593 (noting that the primary goal of the BCRA was to prevent "quid pro
quo corruption of elected officials by special interests and to combat the appearance of
such corruption").
45 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154 (noting that there is substantial evidence to support
Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties
give rise to the suggestion that money buys influence); see Goldberg, supra note 15, at
1145-46 (discussing how in reality the party-building premise is a legal fiction, whereby
soft money is raised by federal candidates, and though the spending is confined to the
parties, the federal candidates themselves coordinate the spending, thus causing money
donors to have a dramatic influence on federal elections).
46 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 443 (2001) (noting how some have argued for a reexamination of issues addressed in
Buckley "in light of post-Buckley developments in campaign finance"); see also Kristen
Kay Sheils, Landell Bodes Well for Campaign Finance Reform: A Compelling Case for
Limiting Campaign Expenditures, 26 VT. L. REV. 471, 485-86 (2002) (finding support from
various cases for interpreting the Buckley decision to hold that all campaign expenditure
limits are not unconstitutional as a matter of law, and that it may be possible to establish
a factual record to provide that "preserving faith in democracy" or "freeing officeholders
from the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties" can be sufficient
justifications for expenditure limits).
47 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
48 Id. at 405 (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) ("it might prove possible to
reinterpret aspects of Buckley in light of the post-Buckley experience stressed by Justice
Kennedy... making less absolute the contribution/expenditure line, particularly in
respect to independently wealthy candidates, whose expenditures might be considered
contributions to their own campaigns"); see Sheils, supra note 46, at 484 (discussing
Nixon, Justice Breyer's statement, and the cases that followed).
49 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88 (discussing First Amendment implication by a
"significant interference" with associational rights).
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decide whether the provision in question serves a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest. 50 Finally, the Court looks to
see if the means and ends are narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.51
Recently, in Landell v. Sorrell,52 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on the issue of campaign
expenditure caps, overturning a 2000 Vermont District Court
opinion.5 3 The majority of the Second Circuit concluded that a
Vermont law authorizing limits on the amount of money
candidates could spend on campaigns 54 was constitutional and
right in line with the Buckley framework. In upholding the law,
the court focused on a tandem of compelling government
interests: An anticorruption interest 55  and a time-saving
interest. 56 Upholding Vermont's campaign expenditure limits
was the first decision of its kind.57 On September 27, 2005, the
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review both the
50 Id. (stating the government must demonstrate that the infringement of First
Amendment rights were "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important interest" in
order to survive).
51 Id. at 395 (finding that the statute was sufficiently tailored to serve its purpose).
52 Landell v. Sorrell (Landell 11), 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002) rev'd sub nom. Randall v.
Sorrell (Landell III), 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
53 Id. at 97. Judge Sessions reviewed each provision of Vermont's Act 64 separately,
and ultimately ruled that three aspects of the legislation were unconstitutional. This
Court of Appeals decision affirmed in part and vacated in part, and remanded the Federal
District Courts decision in, Landell v. Sorrell (Landell 1), 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt.
2000). See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Campaign Finance Law: Decision Not to
Hear 'Landell'In Banc, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 2005, at 3. This article discusses the Landell II
decision, in that it withdrew its original 2002 opinion and issued another in 2004, still
holding that Vermont's interests were sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny
and ruled that the case be remanded for the district court to determine whether the
expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to achieve their interest. Id.
54 Landell II, 382 F.3d at 107-08 (finding that "the Buckley Court did not conclude
that the Constitution would always prohibit expenditure limits," and that there remains
the possibility of a sufficient government interest that could allow for expenditure limits
to survive constitutional review, which are present in the present case).
55 Id. at 115-19, 125 (commenting on anti-corruption as a legitimate governmental
interest, finding that taken with the state's time saving interest, it is sufficiently
compelling to support expenditure limits).
56 Id. at 119-24 (discussing the interest of "assuring that candidates and officeholders
will spend less time fundraising and more time interacting with voters and performing
official duties" as a legitimate government interest, finding that taken with the state's
anti-corruption interest, it is sufficiently compelling to support expenditure limits).
57 See Huff, supra note 11, at 243 (commenting on campaign finance reform activists'
praise for the decision since it is the first of its kind); Editorial, Campaign Finance
Nirvana, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at A10 (discussing the Landell II decision, and that
"[s]upporters of strict limits on campaign finance must think they've died and gone to
heaven, now that a court has for the first time upheld limits on how much candidates may
spend even if they aren't receiving public funds").
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expenditure and contribution caps found in Vermont's Act 64.58
The Supreme Court heard this case on February 28, 200659 and
has recently issued its decision, much to the dismay of
individuals in favor of increased campaign finance reform.
This comment focuses on the constitutionality of campaign
expenditure limits, in light of the Buckley framework established
thirty years ago. Part I of this comment explores the holdings in
Landell, as well as two other circuit court decisions which stand
in sharp contrast to the Second Circuit opinion. Part II discusses
the recent Supreme Court decision in Randall, reversing Landell,
with a focus on the Court's analysis of expenditure caps in light
of the Buckley framework. Finally, Part III discusses why the
Supreme Court was incorrect in applying strict stare decisis in
light of the facts and arguments presented by the Randall case.
PART I
THE LANDELL DECISION: A CLOSE EXAMINATION
The District Court's Decision
A. Statement of the Facts
The United States District Court for the District of Vermont
was faced with the issue of the constitutionality of Vermont's Act
64.60 This 1997 overhaul of the Vermont campaign finance
system "represent[ed] a return to the state's policy established
almost forty years before of directly limiting campaign
expenditures for certain state offices."61 Act 64 was originally
58 Landell II, 382 F.3d 91, cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Sorrel (Landell II1), 126
S. Ct. 35 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-1528), (No. 04-1530), and 126 S. Ct. 36 (No. 04-
1697).
59 Randall v. Sorrell (Landell II1), 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485 (2006) (reversing the Second
Circuit's decision in Landell II, finding that expenditure limits are inconsistent with the
First Amendment, as well as well-established precedent).
60 Landell v. Sorrell (Landell 1), 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (D. Vt. 2000) ("This is a
constitutional challenge to the 1997 Vermont Campaign finance Reform Act."), aff'd in pt.
vacated in pt., Landell v. Sorrell (Landell fl), 382 F.3d. 91 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell (Landell I1), 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
61 William P. Russell, A Brief History of Campaign Finance Legislation in Vermont,
27 VT. L. REV. 699, 700-01 (2003) (discussing how in 1961 there was a limitation put on
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proposed to include voluntary expenditure limits for electoral
campaigns, but was later converted into "universal and
mandatory limits." 62 After being introduced in the House, 63
modifications were made, and the Senate adopted all of the
justifications for spending limitations.64 Once adopted in both
houses, the Governor signed the bill on June 26, 1997.65 The final
version of Act 64, which became effective at the beginning of the
2000 general election cycle, read as follows:
§ 2805a. CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS;
AMOUNTS
(a) The following campaign expenditure limitations shall
apply to all candidates, for all primary general, and local
elections, whether or not a candidate accepts Vermont
campaign finance grants under subchapter 6 of this chapter,
is financing his or her campaign from private contributions,
or from the candidate's own resources or that of his or her
immediate family.
expenditures where primary candidates were not authorized to spend more than $7,500
for their campaign).
62 Id. at 712 (noting how Act 64, prior to enactment, had been voluntary expenditure
limits, which evolved into "universal and mandatory" expenditure limits by the time of
enactment); See Richard Briffault, The Return of Spending Limits: Campaign Finance
After Landell v. Sorrell, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 410 (2005) (demonstrating how Act
64's restrictions apply to all candidates for state office).
63 See Russell, supra note 61, at 712 (noting that the bill was being debated in the
house twenty-two days before the Senate's version of the same bill); see also H. 0028, 1997
leg., 1997-1998 Sess. (Vt. 1997), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/
summary.cfm?Bill=H%2E0028&Session=1998 (listing H.28, titled, Public Financing of
Election Campaigns, which was a House bill that was the instrument which became Act
64); S. 0069, 1997 leg., 1997-1998 Sess. (Vt. 1997), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
database/statussummary.cfm?Bill=S%2E0069&Session=1998 (cataloging S. 69, titled,
Public Financing of Campaigns & Limitations on Expenditures, which was a Senate bill
that stated the provisions pertaining to campaign spending limits that were subsequently
enacted in Act 64).
64 Russell, supra note 61, at 712 (discussing provisions that were changed, and the
eventual recommendation of maximum spending limit provisions); see also Gen. Assemb.
64, 1997 Leg., 1997-1998 Sess. (Vt. 1997), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/DOCS/
1998/ACTS/ACT064.HTM (noting the amendments, individual votes, and provides a full
text of Act 64, titled, An Act Relating to Public Financing of Election Campaigns,
Disclosure Requirements and Limits on Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, as it
was Enacted into Law).
65 See Gen. Assemb. 64, 1997 Leg., 1997-1998 Sess. (Vt. 1997), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/DOCS/1998/ACTS/ACT064.HTM (laying out provisions relating
to financing election campaigns); see also Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (discussing that
Act 64 enjoyed "widespread bipartisan support" and was signed by Governor Howard
Dean on June 26, 1997); Russell, supra note 61, at 716-17 (noting that after the adoption
of Act 64 by both houses of the Vermont Legislature, the Governor of Vermont signed the
Act into law on June 26, 1997).
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(1) A candidate for governor shall limit campaign
expenditures to no more than $300,000.00 in any two-year
general election cycle.
(2) A candidate for lieutenant governor shall limit campaign
expenditures to no more than $100,000.00 in any two-year
general election cycle
(3) A candidate for secretary of state, state treasurer, auditor
of accounts or attorney general shall limit campaign
expenditures to no more than $45,000.00 in any two-year
general election cycle.
(4) A candidate for state senator or county office shall limit
campaign expenditures to no more than $4,000.00 plus, in
the case of state senator, an additional $2,500.00 for each
additional seat in the senate district, in any two-year general
election cycle.
(5) A candidate for state representative in a single-member
district shall limit campaign expenditures to no more than
$2,000.00, and in a two-member district to no more than
$3,000.00, in any two-year general election cycle.
(b) Recognizing the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United
States to enact expenditure limitations and campaign
finance reforms for candidates in federal office, the general
assembly of the state of Vermont expects candidates for the
United States House of Representatives and Senate to
observe the contribution and expenditure limitations that
apply to candidates for the office of governor.
(c) If a candidate for the office of governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, auditor of
accounts or attorney general is an incumbent of the office
being sought, the candidate shall be permitted to expend
only 85% of the amount allowed for that office under this
section. If a candidate for the general assembly is an
incumbent of the office being sought, the candidate shall be
permitted to expend only 90% of the amount allowed for that
office under this section.
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(d) For purpose of this section, the term "candidate" includes
the candidate's political committee.66
Various plaintiffs claimed that the single source rule, the two-
year election cycle, and the 25% limit imposed on out-of-state
contributions limited their ability to run effective campaigns and
was a violation of their First Amendment rights.67
B. The District Court's Opinion
The ten-day bench trial included much of Act 64's legislative
debate, as the Court noted that the constitutionality of the
legislation would heavily depend on the factual circumstances
surrounding the drafting of the legislation.68 Legislative findings
showed that "rising spending levels denied some Vermonters the
opportunity to run for office, required candidates to devote
'inordinate amounts of time raising campaign funds', and
reduced 'public involvement and confidence in the electoral
process."'69 Additionally, the court found another important
government interest in minimizing the "reality and appearance
of corruption, stemming [from] the manipulative practice of
bundling, increasing candidate-voter contact, and inspiring
participation in the electoral process."70 The district court noted
that "[g]iven the wealth of evidence gathered by the Vermont
legislature ... this [c]ourt understands why it included spending
limits as part of its comprehensive campaign finance bill."71 The
court went on to conclude that such spending limits are an
66 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17, § 2805a (2001).
67 Id.; see Mitchell L. Pearl, Against Act 64: Preserving Political Freedom for the
Candidate and the Citizen, Brief for the Appellants in Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV.
721, 722 (2003) (highlighting the particular effects of Act 64 on Mr. Neil Randall, an
incumbent representative in the Vermont legislature); cf. Huff, supra note 11, at 245-46
(discussing how the First Amendment, through its incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment, limits the power of states in regulating campaign finance).
68 See Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 464, 468 (noting that "the constitutionality of some
provisions of Act 64 depends heavily on facts"); see also John T. Cooke, Making the Case
for Campaign Finance: One Theory Explaining the Withdrawal of Landell v. Sorrell, 27
VT. L. REV. 685, 690 (2003) (discussing the Landell court's inclusion of a substantial
portion of Act 64's legislative debate in its opinion and noting the ten day bench trial the
court conducted to gather more facts on the background of the legislation).
69 See Briffault, supra note 62, at 410 (explaining how the Act was an "end-
product.., that included extensive legislative deliberation .... ); see also Landell, 118 F.
Supp. 2d at 468 (highlighting the specific findings of the Vermont General Assembly).
70 Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
71 Id. at 483 (noting that in light of the evidence, the court was still bound by the
doctrine of stare decisis).
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"effective response to certain compelling governmental interests
not addressed in Buckley," including the protection of
officeholders' abilities to focus on their elected capacities,
"[pireserving faith in our democracy", and protecting individuals
access to the political forum. 72
However, despite its sympathetic tone, the court struck down
Act 64 as unconstitutional. 73  Relying on the established
precedent in Buckley, the court felt compelled to invalidate the
law. 74 The court majority stated it "[could] not take the
unprecedented step of finding expenditure limits
constitutional."75  Similarly, it noted that it was not
"insignificant" that the Vermont legislature amended its
campaign finance provisions by "eliminating mandatory spending
limits" as soon as the Supreme Court handed down the Buckley
decision. 76 Finally, the district court explained how the Second
Circuit had not yet ruled on the issue, and how it felt
uncomfortable with an opinion that was not founded in case
law. 77
C. The Second Circuit Reverses
The district court's decision was appealed and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals heard the arguments on May 7, 2001.78
After it initially issued an opinion in August 2002, the opinion
was withdrawn just two months later, while a petition for a
rehearing en banc was pending. 79 The petition for rehearing en
72 Id. at 482-483.
73 Id. at 483.
74 Id.
75 Id. (discussing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, and how it also followed the established
precedent and thus must also be given proper consideration); see generally Kruse v. City
of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (establishing precedent Landell court felt
compelled to follow).
76 Id. The court found that the change in the law served at least as some indication
that the legislature in Vermont was "dubious" about the constitutionality of spending
limits at that point in time. Id.
77 At the time of the decision, spending limits only existed in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, and there had yet to be a constitutional challenge surrounding those expenditure
caps. Id.
78 Landell v. Vt. Public Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2002) (stating the
appeal was argued on May 7, 2001).
79 See Briffault, supra note 62, at 411 (summarizing the judicial history of the Landell
decisions); see also Suzanne Nelson, Court Could Revisit 'Buckley" Spending Cap in
Vermont at Issue, ROLL CALL, May 16, 2005 (discussing plaintiffs appeal to have the case
heard by all 12 active circuit judges).
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banc was eventually denied.80 The court finally issued an
amended opinion in August 2004.81
The court, in a 2-1 decision, held that it was not as limited by
the Buckley framework as the district court had previously
determined.8 2 Rather, the court found that Buckley did not stand
for the proposition that expenditure limits were, by their very
nature, "per se unconstitutional." 83 As Judge Straub writes,
"Buckley v. Valeo... left the door ajar for narrowly tailored
spending limits that secure clearly identified and appropriately
documented compelling governmental interests."84 In its brief,
Vermont discussed different compelling government interests
that Act 64 supposedly served. These interests were: "(1)
avoiding the reality and appearance of corruption in elective
politics and government"; (2) "assuring that candidates and
officeholders will spend less time fund-raising and more time
interacting with voters and performing official duties"; (3)
"promoting electoral competition and in protecting equal access
to political participation"; (4) "bolstering voter interest and
engagement in elective politics"; and (5) "enhancing the quality of
political debate and voters' understanding of the issues." 85
Similarly, Amicus Brennan Center for Justice relied on the first
three interests identified by Vermont, and also relied upon by
80 Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 159 (2d Cir. 2005). See Briffault, supra note 62, at
415-17. Five members of the court dissented from the decision not to rehear the case en
banc. Four of those dissenters argued that the Buckley precedent prevented the court
from finding Vermont's spending limits to be constitutional. In doing so, the court barred
the use of the anti-corruption arguments used by the majority to uphold the spending
limits and rejected the argument that there was a compelling government interest in the
time protection argument. Conversely, seven members of the Second Circuit, including
the two justices who drafted the majority opinion from the Landell panel, voted to deny
the rehearing in banc. The denial was rooted in the "Second Circuit's longstanding
tradition of rejecting en banc review" and was not based on the outcome of the panel
decision. Judge Calabresi wrote a separate concurrence, focusing on the First Amendment
issues presented by the spending caps. He challenged the reading of Buckley that
determined the constitutionality of campaign finance litigation solely on the basis of
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Finally, Judge Calabresi ended his
concurrence by encouraging the Supreme Court to take a closer look at the panel decision
and to determine, once and for all, the constitutionality of other justifications for
campaign expenditure restrictions. Id.
81 Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 126
S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
82 Id. at 97 (noting how Judge Winter dissents from the majority opinion of Judge
Straub and Judge Pooler).
83 Id.
84 Id. (discussing how the Vermont law was narrowly tailored to meet the clearly
identifiable governmental interests).
85 Id.
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intervenors, described as (1) "eliminating corruption and the
appearance of corruption in the political process"; (2) "ensuring
that officeholders can spend less time fund-raising and more time
performing their duties" and (3) "bolstering equal access to
political office and restoring the public's confidence in the
electoral system."86
The court noted how Buckley did not "permanently foreclose"
any consideration of campaign expenditure limits, and relied on
the opinions of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens in Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Gov't Pac,87 which noted a "flexible approach
to the constitutional review" of campaign finance limitations was
necessary.8 8 Though the standard of review, strict scrutiny, posed
a high barrier, that barrier was not "impenetrable."89 After
noting that the "quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised",90 the majority applied this imprecise test to the interests
asserted by Vermont. The majority found two of the proposed
government interests, the "corruptive influence" that unlimited
spending has and "the effect the perpetual fundraising has on the
time of candidates and elected officials", justified the expenditure
limitations, passing even strict scrutiny.9 1 The court criticized
the majority in Buckley for assuming a large number of small
contributions could not "raise the specter of corruption."92 Judge
Straub discussed how much had changed in the thirty years since
the Buckley decision was handed down, and that the majority
could not have "anticipated the whole range of individual
concerns faced by specific states, such as Vermont."93
86 Id. at 115.
87 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
88 Landell, 382 F.3d at 108.
89 Id. at 114.
90 Id. (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391).
91 Id. at 97 (the limits fit within the "narrowly tailored spending limits" Buckley
would allow).
92 Id. at 118 (discussing the plight of the disenfranchised Vermont voter who "could
not afford the price of admission").
93 Id. at 121, n.15 & accompanying text (noting one political commentator who said
that Buckley was decided "before the advent of pervasive war chests and candidate-PAC
merchandizing bazaars"); see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1994) (discussing changes driving campaign finance
movement during 1990's).
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Additionally, the court concluded that contribution limits alone
did not ensure the prevention of corruption and appearance of
corruption concerns. 94
Judge Winter drafted a lengthy dissent. He found Act 64 to be
unconstitutionally vague, and therefore found that Buckley
invalidated the legislation. 95  Specifically, the words
"contribution" and "expenditure", along with the phrase "paid to
a candidate" were particularly troublesome. 96 After questioning
much of the data presented by the state, Judge Winter noted that
expenditure caps force those individuals who make political
decisions to "give priority to activities that reach the largest
number of voters."97 Judge Winter concluded that the number of
self-interested decision makers was going to increase and that
the asserted government interests were "largely sparse,
anecdotal, and conclusory" and did not meet the exacting strict
scrutiny that is required when such First Amendment rights are
withheld by the state. 98
APPROACHES ADOPTED BY OTHER CIRCUITS
A. The Sixth Circuit's Approach: Kruse v. City of Cincinnati99
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first
court that attempted a judicial interpretation of the Buckley
expenditure limits ruling. 0 0 The ordinance in question was City
94 Landell, 382 F.3d at 119 (noting that with contribution limits firmly in place, "the
arms race mentality has made candidates beholden to financial constituencies that
contribute to them," thus diverting candidate's attention away from other duties).
95 Id. at 163 (Winter, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 165-66 (discussing the ambiguities of these words and phrases).
97 Id. at 172 (discussing decision makers' focus on mass media, as opposed to activity
at "grassroots" level).
98 Id. at 189 (holding that the evidentiary record of the Act presents no evidence
concluding that the limits on contribution will "eliminate any improper influence").
99 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
100 See Christopher J. Ayers, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law and the
Fourth Circuit, 2000: Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for Campaign Finance Reform,
79 N.C. L. REV. 1788, 1797-98 (2001) (summarizing the Kruse decision and its potential
impact on the 4th Circuit); John Bonifaz et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal
Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 42 (1999) (highlighting that Kruse case was "first test case
in twenty-two years to address directly the question of the constitutionality of campaign
spending limits").
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
Ordinance 240-1995, passed by the Cincinnati City Council.101
The legislation placed a cap on campaign expenditures for city
council candidates, ensuring that each individual could not spend
more than three times the annual salary of such a council
member. 102
The parties supporting the Ordinance argued that the limits
are "different in kind and degree" from the governmental
interests asserted and subsequently rejected in Buckley.103 First,
proponents of the Ordinance cited the "corruption and the
appearance of corruption" rationale.O4 To support their claim,
those parties brought forth evidence that wealthy campaign
donors caused "undue influence" in the political arena as a whole,
and more specifically that the high cost of a successful campaign
discouraged many capable individuals from running for public
office, which in turn "deprive[d] voters of a full choice of
candidates."105 In upholding the decision of the District Court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
that Buckley "foreclosed ... as a matter of law" the use of the
anti-corruption argument as a justification for upholding
expenditure limitations.106 The court found that the city failed to
show how spending limits were "[strictly] necess[ary]" to prevent
corruption, in light of the fact that the city placed the spending
limits in place before any contribution limits were executed.107
The Sixth Circuit rejected a new rationale for expenditure
caps, not yet offered to the Supreme Court, that there is an
interest in reducing the time burden that fundraising poses for
101 Kruse, 142 F.3d at 909 (discussing how legislation was passed in response to
"steady" rise in campaigning costs for city council positions).
102 Id. (estimating expenditure ceiling to be $140,000).
103 Id. (noting how proponents of expenditure limits asked that Sixth Circuit
distinguish Buckley).
104 Id. at 915 (discussing how Buckley decision leaves no open questions regarding
"corruption and appearance of corruption" rationale as unjustified in upholding
expenditure caps).
105 Id. at 911. The public opinion survey found in the defendant's brief was comprised
of telephone surveys and focus groups. Id. Affidavits were also included from both current
and former council members who were concerned by the "corrupting nature of money in
Cincinnati politics." Id. Statements made by both the League of Women Voters and
Common Cause shared the same sentiments. Id.
106 Id. at 915 (noting that expenditure limits were not justified as a mechanism for
ensuring that those who donate money to campaigns would not try to circumvent any
contribution limits which may exist).
107 Id. at 916 (discussing the city's lack of evidence as it pertains to the prevention of
corruption justification).
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both officeholders and candidates because of "allegedly
skyrocketing costs of political campaigns." 108 In his majority
opinion, Judge Kennedy noted that although the high cost of
campaigns directly caused an increase in the time spent
soliciting money, the government still could not constitutionally
limit "the cost of campaigns, [and] the need to spend time raising
money," even though it detracted incumbents from doing the job
they were elected to do. 109 The court found this argument to be
no more than an offshoot of another interest asserted, the
interest in preventing the rise of campaign costs. Such an
argument was struck down by Buckley, which did not find the
interest compelling under the First Amendment standard.110
Finally, the court also struck down an interest in preventing
the continued erosion of trust in government, in conjunction with
the "pervasive cynicism" that discouraged the public's
participation in the democratic process.1 1 The court refused to
find that such an interest was a new type of corruption, not
discussed in Buckley or previously examined by the Supreme
Court, and thus ultimately struck down the expenditure limits as
whole, finding them to be unconstitutional.112
A concurrence was written by District Judge Cohn.113 While
noting that both Buckley and this case were both decided on a
"slender" factual record, Cohn disagreed with the majority's per
108 Id. Quoting Buckley's First Amendment rule:
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to
promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society
ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people - individually as
citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees - who
must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976))
109 Id. at 916-17.
110 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (holding that the growth in the cost of
election campaigns provides no basis for government-imposed limitations on campaign
spending); see also Kruse, 142 F.3d at 916 (upholding Buckley's determination that an
interest in "reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns" was not
compelling).
111 Kruse, 142 F.3d at 916 (interpreting Buckley to hold that such an interest was not
compelling or constitutionally sufficient to justify campaign spending restrictions).
112 Id. (finding the erosion of public trust argument to be an "outgrowth of the
problems of actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption ... and of the inequalities of
private economic power" and thus not constitutionally sufficient to justify campaign
spending limits).
113 Id. at 919 (Cohn, J., concurring).
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se ruling with regard to the time interest justification.ll4 He
noted that the time protection interest was wholly independent of
the limitation on the costs of campaigns justification.115 To
support this proposition, he cited the amicus brief presented by
The Brennan Center, which included a number of startling facts
regarding the amount of time candidates actually spent soliciting
donations to their prospective campaigns.116 Cohn concluded his
concurrence by noting that Buckley did not create a broad and
rigid rule which declared all campaign expenditure limits
unconstitutional. "It may be possible to develop a factual record
to establish that the interest in freeing officeholders from the
pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties, or the
interest in preserving faith in our democracy, is compelling, and
that campaign expenditure limits are a narrowly tailored means
of serving such an interest."11 7
B. The Tenth Circuit's Approach: Homans v. City of
Albuquerque 18
Three years later, the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico was confronted by a similar set of facts to
those in Kruse.119 At issue was Article XIII, Section 4(d)(2) of the
Albuquerque City Charter, which prevented mayoral candidates
from spending more than two times the annual salary of the
Mayor of Albuquerque on their individual campaigns.120 The
114 Id. (noting that the statement "because the government cannot constitutionally
limit the cost of campaigns, the need to spend time raising money, which admittedly
detracts an officers from doing her job, cannot serve as a good basis for limiting campaign
spending" was beyond the scope of the factual record in the case).
115 Id. (calling for a determination of whether the time interest was "sufficiently
compelling," to be left for another day).
116 Id. at 919 n.1. A former member of Congress estimated that nearly 80% of the
time spent during a campaign, by both he and his staff, was spent fundraising.
Additionally, even President Clinton often complained about the time spent on
fundraising and how it prevented him from "issue[ing] executive orders", as his focus was
continually on the next fundraising event. Id.
117 Id. at 920.
118 Homans v. City of Albuquerque (Homans 11), 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
119 See Adam B. Wells, Campaign Expenditure Limits: A Right Turn at Albuquerque,
29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 559, 577-78 (2005) (discussing the backdrop and history of the
Albuquerque limits); see also Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The
Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected
Officials, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 692-95 (2006) (discussing the facts and opinion of the
court).
120 Homans v. City of Albuquerque (Homans 1), 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1198 (D. N.M.
2002). That Section of the Charter states:
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challenger to the expenditure caps was Mr. Rick Homans, a "duly
qualified candidate" for Mayor of Albuquerque, who claimed the
City Charter was an unconstitutional infringement on his First
Amendment rights.121 United States District Court Judge
Martha Vazquez' opinion outlined the history of expenditure cap
interpretation, beginning with the Buckley framework, and noted
the circuit split that existed as a result of the Second Circuit's
Landell decision and the Tenth Circuit's holdings in the area. 122
The court ultimately concluded that as a result of the Buckley
decision, a "clear statement" was provided for future courts that
expenditure limits do not survive under the following rationales:
"deterring corruption and preventing evasion of contribution
limits," equalizing the finances available for candidates, and
setting limits on expenditures in order to keep the general costs
of elections down.123
The case soon reached its way up to the Tenth Circuit. The
City of Albuquerque presented the court with three different
justifications for upholding the expenditure limitations.124 In its
brief, the city argued that the "deterring corruption and
preventing erosion" rationale is sufficient to pass even the
strictest scrutiny.125 Additionally, the city contended that
equalizing the financial resources of mayoral candidates and
"restraining the cost of election campaigns for its own sake" were
compelling interests that were narrowly tailored.126 The Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court's decision. After noting that "the
distinction between campaign expenditures and campaign
(d) No candidate shall allow contributions or make expenditures in excess of the
following for any election:
(2) To a candidate for the office of Mayor contributions or expenditures equal to
twice the amount of the annual salary paid by the City of Albuquerque to the
Mayor as of the date of filling of the Declaration of Candidacy.
Id.
121 Id. at 1199-1200 (noting that Mr. Homans was subject to a $500 fine for each
violation of the expenditure limits, and that in the event he won the election, he was
subject to "public reprimand" and removal from office).
122 Id. at 1204-06 (outlining history of expenditure caps in the judiciary and the
different interpretations of the Buckley standard).
123 Id. at 1205-06 (noting how the district court within the Tenth Circuit was bound
to follow the precedent that was established by higher courts in the circuit).
124 Homans v. City of Albuquerque (Homans 1H), 264 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (10th Cir.
2001). The City's justifications were: (1) deterring corruption and preventing evasion of
contribution limits; (2) equalizing the financial resources of the candidates; and (3)
restraining the cost of election campaigns for its own sake. Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. (noting that even under the strict scrutiny standard, "the facts do matter").
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contributions is about to change,"127 the court felt compelled to
follow the standard as handed down by the Supreme Court in
Buckley, despite Judge Cohn's concurrence in Kruse that
"Buckley may not be the last word on expenditure limits."128
Thus, the court accordingly concluded that Mr. Homans had
"demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits"
and enjoined the City of Albuquerque from enforcing the
campaign expenditure limitations. 129
PART II
SUPREME COURT DECISION
On June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Randall v. Sorrell,130 the result of a consolidation of cases arising
out of the Landell decision from 2004. Justice Breyer delivered
the opinion of the Court, holding that both the expenditure limits
and contribution limits imposed by Vermont's Act 64 were
unconstitutional.131 Both sets of limits were found to violate the
First Amendment. 132 The Court went to great lengths to discuss
how the contribution limits failed to satisfy the "careful tailoring"
requirement of the First Amendment. 133 Deeming the question of
contribution limits to be "more complex" than that of expenditure
limits, Justice Breyer explained that contribution limits were
permissible if they were "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently
important interest".134 Historically, preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption was deemed a "sufficiently
127 Id. at 1244.
128 Id. (examining the opinions in Kruse and the district court in Landell).
129 Id. at 1244-45 (noting how the court was "unpersuaded" by the city's contentions,
based on the precedent established by the Supreme Court).
130 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
131 Id. at 2485.
132 Id.
133 Id. (discussing burdens resulting from Vermont's contribution limits as
"disproportionately severe" when compared to the statute's objectives).
134 Id. at 2491. Using the Buckley framework, the Court explained that contribution
limits, like expenditure limits, implicated fundamental First Amendment interests.
Specifically, contribution limits hinder the freedoms of "political expression" and "political
association". Id. To determine if such limits were closely drawn, the Court has looked at
the amount of the limit. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n., 453 U.S. 182,
184-85, 201 (1981). The Court upheld a $5,000 limit on contributions to multi-candidate
political committees. Id. at 201.
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important interest" in order to justify contribution limits.135
Here, while such sufficient interests were asserted, the Court
acknowledged that the contribution limits posed a risk to the
democratic electoral process, as they were not closely drawn.136
The Vermont limitations on contributions were the lowest in the
nation and well below the lowest limit that the Supreme Court
has previously upheld.137 These facts, coupled with uncontested
data provided by petitioners showing that contribution limits had
substantially restrictive effects on strongly contested elections,
spelled the ultimate end of Act 64's contribution limits.138
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a vigorous
concurrence, noting that the contribution limits presented in Act
64 were, in fact, unconstitutional, but for a different reason. 139
Justice Thomas argued that the amorphous Buckley standard
was difficult, if not nearly impossible to apply in practice, as the
plurality appeared concerned only with a few key factors: "the
limits [were] the lowest in the Nation," the limits were lower
than any previously upheld, the limits were set per election cycle,
and the limits "appl[ied] to contributions from political
parties."140 Justices Thomas and Scalia noted that while these
factors are important in determining the constitutionality of
135 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491.
136 Id. at 2492. Justice Breyer noted "the interests underlying contribution limits,
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption directly implicate the integrity of
our electoral process... [y]et that rationale does not simply mean the lower the limit, the
better." Id. There comes a point where contribution limits are too low, and as a result, can
actually harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from bolstering effective
campaigns. Id.
137 Id. at 2493-94 (noting that Vermont's limit of $200 per election is less than one-
sixth of the comparable limit upheld in a similar Missouri statute); see Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382-83 (2000) (stating that a Republican candidate running
for nomination for a state auditor position during 1997 and 1998, argued that a $1,075
campaign contribution limit prevented him from campaigning effectively).
138 Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2494-99. The Court found that party contributions which
comprised a significant percentage of total campaign income would be cut by nearly 85%
for the average legislator and up to 99% for gubernatorial candidates. Id. at 2495.
Additionally, the important political right of association was threatened as political
parties were faced with the same contribution limits as other individual contributors. Id.
at 2496. The ability for candidates to conduct coordinated advertising, events, and mass
mailings would be severely limited by the low limits on political parties. Id. at 2797.
Finally, Act 64's limits were not adjusted for inflation, thus causing the real value of each
campaign dollar spent to decrease dramatically. Id. at 2499.
139 Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J. and Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Buckley "provides
insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First Amendment").
140 Id. at 2503-05 (explaining that the plurality is concerned "not with the impact on
the speech of contributors, but solely with the speech of candidates, for whom the two
facts might be connected").
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contribution limits, the factors by themselves do not help
determine constitutionality of the limits.141 Justice Thomas went
on to declare the Act 64 contribution limits unconstitutional, but
did not propose a more practical standard to apply in these cases
such as these.142
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment and noted his
skepticism regarding the entire "universe of campaign finance
regulation." 143 He noted that the Supreme Court was partially
to blame for the current state of affairs, as the Court "in part
created and in part permitted" this system to exist through the
course of its decisions in the area. 144
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Stevens, arguing that the contribution limits were not "so
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective,
drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice,
and render contributions pointless."145 He noted that the limits
were not "remarkable departures either from those previously
upheld by this Court or from those lately adopted by other
States."146 Thus, Justice Souter wrote in total agreement with
the respondents in favor of upholding the contribution limits.
The Court seemed much more eager to overturn the
expenditure limits found in Vermont's Act 64, yet the plurality of
the Court could not persuade enough Justices to come to a
consensus as to why these limits were unconstitutional. In
striking down the expenditure limits, Justice Breyer began by
stating as a matter of fact that "[w]ell-established precedent
makes clear that the expenditure limits violate the First
141 Id. at 2503 (reasoning that the first two factors considered by the plurality "have
no bearing on whether the contribution limits are too low" and had no relation to the
compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard of review).
142 Id. at 2505-06 (discussing the various inadequacies of the Buckley approach).
143 Id. at 2501.
144 Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (highlighting some of the general
inadequacies found in the present campaign finance reform system).
145 Id. at 2512-13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000)). The dissent relied heavily on Shrink to establish the legitimacy
of the contribution limits. 'To place Vermont's contribution limits beyond the
constitutional pale, therefore, is to forget not only the facts of Shrink, but also our self-
admonition against second-guessing legislative judgments about the risk of corruption to
which contribution limits have to be fitted." Id. at 2513.
146 Id. at 2512.
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Amendment."14 7 Specifically, he was of the opinion that Act 64's
contribution limits failed in regard to the "careful tailoring"
prong of the First Amendment test. 148 Noting the "fundamental
importance" of stare decisis, Justice Breyer found Act 64 to fit
neatly into the mold established by Buckley, and thus struck
down the expenditure ceilings accordingly.149 The plurality noted
that the respondents were asking the Court to do one of two
things: distinguish these cases from Buckley or overrule Buckley
completely, neither of which the plurality was willing to do.150
Justice Breyer was unable to find "any demonstration that
circumstances ha[d] changed so radically... to undermine
Buckley's critical factual assumptions", and declined the
opportunity to overturn the precedent established over thirty
years earlier' 5 ' Similarly, the plurality opted not to distinguish
Buckley on the grounds that the limits imposed by Act 64 were
not substantially different from those in Buckley.152 Similarly,
the Court did not find the justification posed by respondents
sufficient for distinguishing the two cases, namely that limits
were "necessary in order to reduce the amount of time candidates
must spend raising money."153 Justice Breyer was of the opinion
that while Buckley did not address these justifications, it was
"highly unlikely" that the outcome of the case would have been
different.154 He was heavily persuaded by the fact that the Court
of Appeals opinion, as well as the briefs written in Buckley, noted
147 Id. at 2485 (noting how expenditure caps "necessarily reduce the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached").
148 Id. (discussing the burdens placed on the First Amendment that are
"disproportionately severe").
149 Id. at 2489 (quoting United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517
U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (noting that stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process").
150 Id. at 2489-90 (finding the case one that "fits the stare decisis norm").
151 Id. Justice Breyer used the example of the respondents' inability to show there
was a "dramatic increase" in corruption or its appearance in Vermont, to justify the
application of Buckley to the facts at hand. Id. at 2489. Similarly, he was of the opinion
that respondents did little to prove that expenditure limits are "the only way" to attack
the corruption problem. Id. at 2490.
152 Id. at 2490 (demonstrating that in both cases, a dollar cap was imposed on the
amount candidates were allowed to spend on their campaigns).
153 Id. (noting that the increased costs of campaigning, along with the fear of "a
better-funded opponent" allegedly caused candidates to spend too much time raising
money for campaigns instead of "meeting the voters and engaging in public debate").
154 Id. (stating that the Buckley Court was cognizant of the link between expenditure
limits and reductions in fundraising time).
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that a natural consequence of higher campaign expenditures was
that "candidates were compelled to allot to fund raising
increasing and extreme amounts of time and energy."155 Justice
Breyer concluded his discussion of expenditure caps by pointing
out that the connection between high campaign costs and
increased fundraising demands was "perfectly obvious", and
therefore any failure to mention the merits of the argument on
the part of the Buckley Court simply meant that the argument
was falling upon deaf ears. 156
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter each wrote separate
dissents, both arguing why the expenditure caps should have
been upheld, even in light of the firmly established precedent.
Justice Stevens found that the time had come to overrule the
Buckley framework, since the Court in Buckley was silent
regarding the "time spent on fund-raising" justification for the
proposed limits.157 Acknowledging the "fundamental importance"
of stare decisis, Justice Stevens echoed the sentiments of Justice
Souter by noting that it is not an "inexorable command."158 In
fact, Buckley's holding in regard to expenditure limits in and of
itself "upset a long-established precedent" whereby congressional
races were subject to statutory limits on expenditures.159 Justice
Stevens demonstrated that stare decisis had never been explicitly
recognized in regard to its rejection of expenditure limits.160
Additionally, he was heavily influenced by an opinion drafted by
Justice White. Justice White, writing for the dissenters in
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 161commented:
155 See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Brief for United
States et al. as Amici Curiae in Buckley v. Valeo, O.T. 1975, Nos. 75-436 and 75-437, p.
36.
156 See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2490-91 (stating Court's decision to avoid overruling or
distinguishing Buckley on the facts presented).
157 Id. at 2506 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting that Buckley does not stand for the
proposition that campaign expenditure caps can never be justified).
158 Id. at 2506-07 (demonstrating that a number of different factors, grouped
together, provide enough justification to question the constitutionality of limits on
campaign finance expenditures).
159 Id. at 2507; see United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575-76 (1957)
(discussing expenditure limits placed on congressional races).
160 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2507 n.1 (noting that stare decisis was important in
Buckley's holding regarding contribution limits, but not expenditure limits).
161 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations on the
spending of money is minimal and indirect. All rights of
direct political expression and advocacy are retained. Even
under the campaign laws as originally enacted, everyone
was free to spend as much as they chose to amplify their
views on general political issues, just not specific
candidates. The restrictions, to the extent they do affect
speech, are viewpoint-neutral and indicate no hostility to
the speech itself or its effects.162
Thus, reasoned Justice Stevens, the expenditure caps were "far
more akin to time, place and manner restrictions than to
restrictions on the content of speech," and he would therefore opt
to uphold the limits if they served a "legitimate and sufficiently
substantial" purpose. 163
After citing numerous examples of "effective speech in the
political arena" that involved little to no cost for campaigners,
Justice Stevens focused on the legitimacy of the interests
presented by the respondents.164 In addition to the corruption
argument presented in Buckley and Landell, he viewed the limits
as a legitimate means of protecting equal access to the political
arena and helping candidates' staffs avoid the "interminable
burden of fundraising."165 Justice Stevens also dismissed a
popular "conspiracy theory", that expenditure limits were
established to protect incumbents, citing statistics from the
Homans case involving financing elections in Albuquerque, New
Mexico.166 In his concluding remarks, he pointed to the
intentions of the Framers with regard to election campaigns. He
noted that the Framers would be "appalled" by the modern
campaigning system and that it wasn't their intent to have
judges interfere with state-made limits on expenditures that
162 Id. at 508-09.
163 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 2509 (noting limits protect against corruption, free candidates from burdens
of raising funds and protect equal access to the political arena).
•165 Id. at 2509; see Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (discussing "net effect" of expenditure caps in federal
campaigns).
166 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding "no convincing
evidence that these important interests favoring expenditure limits are fronts for
incumbency protection); see Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 217 F. Supp. 2d. 1197, 1200
(D. NM. 2002) (noting that while 88% of incumbent Mayors were successfully reelected in
1999, the City of Albuquerque with its firm expenditure caps did not have any Mayors
successfully reelected since the caps were enacted).
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merely called for better budgeting efforts on the part of
candidates.167
Justice Ginsberg joined Justice Souter's dissent which scaled
back, at least to some degree, the strong and passionate dissent
drafted by Justice Stevens. Justice Souter did not believe
Vermont was asking for a total abandonment of the Buckley
framework; rather, that the Buckley standard should be applied,
but to the facts in this case which were considerably different
from any seen before.168 He showed that the Buckley Court did
not give any indication that it considered the aims that Vermont
was trying to pursue with Act 64.169 "[T]he Court did not
squarely address a time-protection interest as support for the
expenditure limits, much less one buttressed by as thorough a
record as we have here."170 As a result of the "nonstop pursuit of
money", Justice Souter believed much had changed over the last
thirty years.171 As a result, he called for the case to be remanded
to the District Court in order to determine whether Vermont's
spending limits were the "least restrictive means of
accomplishing what the court unexceptionally found to be worthy
objectives."1 72 Thus, Justice Souter was of the opinion that more
evidentiary work was necessary in order to determine the narrow
tailoring prong of the test, but felt satisfied that compelling
interests existed as a result of the time-savings argument.173
167 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2510-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the Framers
would not have a problem with expenditure limits where no restrictions were imposed on
the content of speeches, debates and interviews).
168 Id. at 2512 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing whether the "fundraising treadmill"
needed to be slowed down in order to support the enactment of Vermont's Act 64).
169 Id. at 2511 (discussing how Buckley only dealt with the corruption and
appearance of corruption justification, and that the case did not foreclose other possible
sufficient interests to "limit" First Amendment speech).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2512 (discussing the enormous spending habits of candidates over the last
few decades).
172 Id. (noting that constitutionality of the expenditure limits was not "conclusively
decided" by the Second Circuit decision).
173 Id. (stating that evidentiary work still remained to be done and would provide the
prospect for sound answers).
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PART III
THOUGH CLOSING, THE DOOR HAS NOT BEEN SLAMMED SHUT
Stare decisis undoubtedly remains the "cornerstone of our legal
system."174 The plurality in Randall recognized the "fundamental
importance" of this legal principle.175 Still, when facts present
themselves or circumstances change warranting lines of cases to
be distinguished or even overruled, judges will not hesitate to
make such necessary changes.176 Herein lays the problem with
the misguided precedent now established by the Supreme Court's
decision in Randall.
Justice O'Connor once proclaimed, "[i]n constitutional
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may
impose new obligations and the thoughtful part of the Nation
could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response
to the Court's constitutional duty."177 As Justice Rehnquist
eloquently stated, "[s]tare decisis ... is a principle of policy and
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision."178
Thus, the concept alone should not prevent changes to
Constitutional principles, where completely necessary.179 If stare
174 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989); see Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 757, 770 (1995) (summarizing key features of a legal system based on stare
decisis).
175 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-57 (2002) (discussing the importance of
respecting decisions of earlier courts).
176 See Dragich, supra note 174, at 770-71 (noting circumstances in which precedent
can be overturned); see also Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 367
(1988) (arguing that the central tenet of the United States legal system is that of judges
following precedent).
177 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
178 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
179 See Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedent and Judicial Policy-Making:
How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influence Social
Change, 32 AKRON L. REV. 233, 249 (1999) (noting that another interpretation of stare
decisis would "violate the maxim that all citizens have a basic right to enjoy their freedom
by living under a Constitution that evolves throughout time"); see also Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 581 (2001) (explaining that "the Court has said repeatedly that stare
decisis is 'not an inexorable command;' [b]ut this need imply no more than that stare
decisis, like many principles of constitutional stature, is capable of being overridden").
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decisis was the final arbiter in Constitutional debates, Plessy v.
Ferguson180 would still be the controlling law of the land.
Much has changed over the last 30 years since Buckley. The
ruling has been faced with increasing dissent in both the legal
and political community.'18 More than ten Congressional bills
have been introduced, each calling for the establishment of
spending limits for federal elections. 8 2 Similarly, the Attorney
General in more than half the states has denounced the Buckley
decision.I8 3 Still, despite the strong opposition to the Court's
holding, this alone does not warrant a reversal of precedent.
However, as a number of new justifications never presented
before the Supreme Court enter the equation, the scream for
expenditure caps becomes louder than ever.18 4 Randall had
provided the legal ammunition for a Buckley revolution of sorts,
one which justified the use of narrowly tailored expenditure
limits when certain compelling justifications were present.
However, the plurality's attempt to end the campaign finance
war once and for all by sweeping these new found justifications
under the rug is certain to drive legislators crazy and add even
more fuel to the campaign finance fire.
The Buckley Court never did permanently shut its doors on the
idea of constitutional expenditure caps. While striking down the
proposed expenditure caps at issue, the majority stated: "No
180 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
181 See Bonifaz, supra note 100, at 41 (1999) (highlighting a signed statement by
more than 200 constitutional scholars calling for the reversal of Buckley with regard to
expenditure caps); see also Phil Neisel, Buckley Brigade to the Rescue: Campaign Finance
Reform, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 289, 299 (1999) (reviewing BUCKLEY STOPS HERE:
LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM) (explaining
the books argument that that Buckley is prime candidate for reversal).
182 See Bonifaz, supra note 100, at 41 (summarizing the opposition for Buckley in
both the Senate and U.S. Department of Justice); see also Alan B. Morrison, What If...
Buckley Were Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 347, 356 (1999) (talking about the
"popular cry" among political activists for reversing Buckley).
183 See Bonifaz, supra note 100, at 41 (stating that Attorney Generals of 26 states
have gone on record opposing Buckley); see also Paul D. Carrington and Adam R. Long,
The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 455, 482 (2002) (stating that Attorney Generals from several states, as well as
United States Justice Department asked for reversal of Buckley); Theodore B. Olson, Rex
E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 1, 29 (2003) (talking about how the Attorney General had his doubts with Buckley
case).
184 See Bonifaz, supra note 100, at 63 (noting a new justification for expenditure caps
to be the enrichment of the "diversity and depth of civic discourse"); see also Shabo, supra
note 3, at 262 (suggesting expenditure caps to be necessary in order for all citizens to
"speak and participate meaningfully in the electoral process").
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governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to
justify [the congressional campaign spending limits]."185 Thus,
the Court remains open to certain compelling governmental
interests that were never suggested to the Buckley Court. 8 6 The
Court reaffirmed this sentiment in Shrink, stating that
''preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the
only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances."187 That the
plurality in Randall asserts it to be "highly unlikely that fuller
consideration of this time protection rationale would have
changed Buckley's result" is highly disturbing, as the time
protection justification has never been fully presented before the
Supreme Court.188 The Randall Court was correct in noting that
Vermont has not demonstrated any change in circumstances so
"radically" different from those in Buckley that would justify the
expenditure limits regarding corruption and the appearance of
corruption justification.18 9 However, since Buckley did not fully
examine the merits of the time protection justification, Buckley is
not the proper "precedent" to follow. How can the Court follow a
precedent that does not yet exist?
Given the proper examination, the time protection justification
proves to be a compelling government interest. In its purest
form, the time protection justification can be summarized by the
following statement:
As candidates spend more money during their
campaigns, they become more shackled to the machinery
of fundraising. They spend increasing amounts of time
dialing for dollars, attending fundraisers, and
cultivating prospective donors. But these candidates,
185 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976).
186 See Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government
Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
669, 721 (2006) (finding the Buckley Court to have "left the door open for the development
of a new rationale that might satisfy strict scrutiny"); see also Bonifaz, supra note 100, at
61-52 (demonstrating that Buckley never stood for the proposition that all expenditure
caps were unconstitutional).
187 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pac., 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (citing Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)).
188 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (2006); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91, 96
(noting that the Court was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a
reduction in fundraising time).
189 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489-90 (explaining both cases, a dollar cap on campaign
expenditures was at issue).
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often already in office themselves, are consequently
spending less time speaking with the people, studying
legislation, and governing. In short, fundraising takes
time away from elected officials in the performance of
their duties. 190
As a result of this diversion of time away from elected duties,
candidates often become "full-time fundraisers," as opposed to
being representatives for the people.191 Ultimately, the political
process breaks down as a result of this lack of focus on elected
officials' responsibilities as officeholders. This "arms race" for
funds, as it helps to break down the political process with every
dollar spent, can be considered a "compelling" justification for
limiting the amount candidates can spend on their campaigns.192
Vermont was not shy in bringing forth evidence to demonstrate
both the arms race and its effect. As Justice Stevens notes in his
dissent, "[m]ountains of evidence" have accumulated over the last
decade demonstrating the adverse effect that activist fundraising
has on the performance of elected officials in their official
capacity.193 One Representative, Bill McCollum, spent at least an
hour every day while in Washington soliciting money for his
campaign.194 While at his Florida residence, McCollum spent the
"bulk" of his time fundraising in what he called "a very time-
consuming" process. 195 Sadly, McCollum was not alone. The
majority of legislators now find themselves "running back and
forth" to meet fundraising demands, consequently taking away
time and attention from their legislative duties. 196
Unfortunately, not all Americans who are interested in becoming
190 See Alexander, supra note 186, at 669 (discussing the particular problems
associated with the diversion of time).
191 See id. (summarizing problems caused by long, calculated fund raising efforts,
especially by incumbents); see also Briffault, supra note 62, at 429-31 (demonstrating how
officeholders are distracted from completing the daily business they were elected to take
care of).
192 See Bonifaz, supra note 100, at 52 (analogizing the costs of city council elections to
an "arms race" as people search for funds in order to compete in elections for office).
193 See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2509 (discussing the important interest of freeing
candidates from the "fundraising straitjacket"); see also Alexander, supra note 186, at
679-80 (examining the "money chase" and its adverse effect on "the real business of
legislating").
194 See Alexander, supra note 186, at 675 (discussing the time demands of the money
clause).
195 See id. (providing statistics to demonstrate the real cost campaign fundraising has
on both officials and their constituents).
196 Id. at 681 (noting how elected officials cleared their legislative calendars in an
effort to ensure adequate time for fundraising).
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legislators have the resources of a Ross Perot or a Mike
Bloomberg.197
The time protection justification is also narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest. No one can deny that the costs
of campaigns have been skyrocketing. For example, while the
total money spent on presidential and congressional elections in
1992 was $1.8 billion, that number increased to $2.2 billion in
1996 and over $3 billion in the 2000 election cycle. 198 The single
most narrowly tailored way to prevent the astronomical costs of
campaigns is to place a cap on the amount candidates can spend.
Thus, instead of spending their time searching for donors,
incumbents can spend their time handling their elected
responsibilities. Similarly, those candidates trying to dethrone
the incumbent can focus their attention on meeting the people
face to face, instead of broadcasting their messages to the people
on television. As Justice Stevens writes in his dissent in
Randall:
But, of course, while a car cannot run without fuel, a
candidate can speak without spending money. And
while a car can only travel so many miles per gallon,
there is no limit on the number of speeches or
interviews a candidate may give on a limited budget.
Moreover, provided that this budget is above a certain
threshold, a candidate can exercise due care to ensure
that her message reaches all the voters. Just as a
driver need not use a Hummer to reach her
destination, so a candidate need not flood the airways
with ceaseless sound-bites of trivial information in
order to provide voters with reasons to support her.199
197 See Jim Rutenberg, Bloomberg Spent $84 Million To Remain Mayor, a Record,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at B2. During Mayor Bloomberg's successful reelection
campaign in 2005, he spent $84 million, $10 million more than he spent to initially win
the position in 2001. Id. See also Sam Roberts, Offers of Coal for the Mayor's Newcastle,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at B4. Bloomberg's opponent, mayoral candidate Fernando
Ferrer, spent a total of $9.1 million on his election bid to become mayor of New York City.
Id.
198 See Huff, supra note 11, at 239 (discussing rising campaign costs at both the
federal and state levels); see also Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent.Protecting Gerrymanders,
116 HARv. L. REV. 649, 666 (2002) (commenting on "rising campaign costs that inhibit
effective challengers").
199 Randall v. Sorrell (Landell 111), 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2508-09 (2006).
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Thus, the narrowly tailored expenditure caps place a brake on
the spiraling campaign costs which are taking up too much time
and tearing political fabric of our country.
Much like the time protection justification, other interests may
be deemed compelling and they too may be grounds for
overruling Buckley. One such justification is the promotion of
competitive elections. 200 Another is voter equality. 201 However, if
the Supreme Court continues to classify all proposed interests as
falling under Buckley's umbrella, seemingly all expenditure caps
will continue to be deemed unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Although stare decisis helps to promote "evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process", 202 the principle does not stand for the proposition that
Constitution and its tenets should not evolve over time. Perhaps if the
Court's composition was the same today as it was a mere two years ago,
the result in Randall would have been different. Campaign finance
reformists take careful note - the door has not been completely shut on the
use of expenditure caps as a means of protecting taxpayers' dollars and
promoting fair elections; perhaps another state will deliver even more
compelling statistics or provide a new and compelling government interest
that will limit the money and time spent on campaigning, while still
preserving every American's First Amendment rights. Until then, the
debate rages on.
200 See Briffault, supra note 62, at 433 (discussing the many advantages that
incumbents have in competitive elections as a result of holding office); see also ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
(2000), available at http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/show-html.php?rid=45
(noting that "[t]he statistical likelihood that the incumbent will be reelected increases his
or her ability to collect funds from donors who want 'access' to the winner").
201 See Briffault, supra note 62, at 435-36 (arguing that the "one person, one vote"
doctrine combined with the Supreme Court's mandate that wealth-based requirements for
voting or running for office be eliminated, be considered another compelling interest that
can be used to overrule Buckley); see also ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra
note 200, at 87 (suggesting our laws "deny a special place for wealth in voting").
202 Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
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